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I. INTRODUCTION

On July 15, 1997, the federal Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) announced its approval of a demonstration project that will allow
New York state to enroll nearly two and a half million low-income persons
in Medicaid managed care plans.' New York's demonstration project-the
largest ever to win HCFA approval-may in a sense be seen as the eldest
child in a new generation of Medicaid managed care programs currently in
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. My
thanks go to Anna Rienhardt for her valuable research assistance and to the Hastings Summer
Research Stipend Program for funding support.
1. Health Care Fin. Admin., HCFAApprovesLargest-EverMedicaidWaiverforNew
York (July 15. 1997) <http://www.hcfa.gov/news/n970715.htm> [hereinafter Largest-Ever
MedicaidWaiver]. The demonstration will cover 2.1 million individuals currently eligible
for Medicaid and approximately 370,000 General Assistance recipients who are not currently
eligible for Medicaid. Id.
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development by the states. It seeks to change fundamentally both the
financing and delivery of medical care for millions of Medicaid recipients,
while simultaneously attempting to respond to the specialized needs of a
much smaller number of recipients with disabilities and chronic diseases.
This responsiveness takes several forms. Some enrollees, such as
nursing home residents, persons with chronic medical conditions whose
existing specialists are not part of any contracting managed care network,
or persons with complex referral needs, may continue to receive services on
a fee-for-service basis.3 Though they do not receive an exemption from the
managed care enrollment requirement, individuals with conditions that
require specialized medical care over a long period of time may be granted
a standing referral to an appropriate specialist within their plan.4 In
addition, the project creates "Special Needs Plans,"' described as "capitated
managed care plans tailored to meet the special needs of people with
specific diagnoses that require intensive case management. ' 6 Except in
these situations, however, Medicaid beneficiaries who are disabled or suffer
from a chronic illness will be required to enroll in the same managed care
plans as the rest of New York's Medicaid population.7 While proponents
of the demonstration project tout it as likely to cut costs and improve access
to care, advocates for the poor have voiced concerns about whether
commercial managed care plans will be able to provide quality care to the
diverse Medicaid population.8
Like New York, a majority of states are shifting at least some of their
Medicaid population into managed care settings. 9 As a result, by June of
1996, forty percent of the more than thirty-three million Medicaid enrollees
nationwide were enrolled in some form of managed care.' ° Until 1997, in

2.
3.

Id.
See id.; see also Health Care Fin. Admin., FactSheet: BeneficiaryProtections:

New York State MedicaidWaiver (July 15, 1997) <http://www.hcfa.gov/facts/f970715.htm>;
Health Care Fin. Admin., New York Statewide Health Reform Demonstration:Fact Sheet

(visited Jan. 15,

1998) <http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/nyfact.htm>

[hereinafter N.Y

DemonstrationFact Sheet].
4. See N. Y. DemonstrationFactSheet, supra note 3.

5.

See Health Care Fin. Admin., Fact Sheet: Special Needs Plans:New York State

Medicaid Waiver (July 15, 1997) <http://www.hcfa.gov/facts/f970715.htm>
Special Needs Plans]; Largest-EverMedicaid Waiver, supra note 1.
6. See Special Needs Plans, supra note 5.

7.
8.

[hereinafter

See N. Y. DemonstrationFact Sheet, supra note 3.
See Roni Rabin, A Medicaid Makeover: Plan Mandates Managed-Care

Enrollment,NEWSDAY, Mar. 19, 1997, at A29; State Deal with US. Will Shift Millions on
Medicaidinto Managed Care, BUFF. NEWS, July 15, 1997, at Al.
9. See Note, The Impact of MedicaidManagedCare on the Uninsured, 110 HARV.

L. REv. 751, 755 (1997) [hereinafter Impact on the Uninsured].
10. See Health Care Fin. Admin., National Summary of MedicaidManaged Care
ProgramsandEnrollment(June30, 1996) <http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/trendsl.htm>; see
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order to make this transition, states had to obtain from HCFA a waiver of
the programmatic requirements imposed by the Medicaid statute." The
Clinton administration, however, relaxed requirements for obtaining such
waivers in 1993,2 and a provision of the 1997 balanced budget legislation
allows a state to move Medicaid recipients into managed
care without
3
obtaining a waiver by amending its state Medicaid plan.
While the political, fiscal, and social forces underlying the massive
movement toward Medicaid managed care are complex, the short explanation is that states generally are pursuing the dual goals of cost savings for
Medicaid programs and improved access to providers for Medicaid
recipients.' 4 States hope that their Medicaid programs will enjoy the same
cost savings attributed to the growth of managed care in the private sector,
and that Medicaid recipients enrolled in a managed care plan will receive
higher quality and more consistent care.' 5 In addition, a handful of states
are seeking to redirect the savings reaped from Medicaid managed care
toward providing coverage for uninsured state residents who are ineligible
for Medicaid.' 6 Notwithstanding these laudable aspirations, skeptics and
critics have highlighted the risks that the move creates for Medicaid
enrollees. These risks-relating to underservice and loss of freedom of
choice-resemble those risks faced by private managed care enrollees, but
they are magnified when posed to a population that is generally in poorer7
health and, for a variety of reasons, less able to protect its own interests.

also infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing primary care case management and
prepaid health plans as alternative forms of managed care that Medicaid plans employ).
11. In general, HCFA can approve two different types of waivers that allow a state
to move some of its Medicaid population into managed care. Under section 1915(b) of the
Social Security Act, HCFA can grant a "freedom of choice" waiver authorizing a state to
place Medicaid beneficiaries in a managed care program that limits their right to select their
own provider. Social Security Act § 1915(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(b) (1994). Under section
1115 of the Social Security Act, HCFA can issue a "research and demonstration" waiver
allowing a state to deviate from numerous Medicaid requirements in order to test new policy
initiatives. Id. § 1115, § 1315. New York's waiver was issued under section 1115. See
Impact on the Uninsured,supra note 9, at 755; Suzanne Rotwein et al., Medicaid and State
Health Care Reform: Process,Programs,andPolicy Options, 16 HEALTH CARE FINANCING
REV. 105, 105-07 (1995).
12. See Impact on the Uninsured, supra note 9, at 755.
13. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4701, 111 Stat. 489, 489
(1997).
14. See John K. Iglehart, MedicaidandManagedCare,322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1727,
1728 (1995).
15. See, e.g., Joseph Berger, In Westchester, Welfare Meets Managed Care, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 1996, at AI (describing efforts and successes in Westchester County, New
York).
16. See Rotwein et al.. supra note I1, at 107.
17. See Colleen A. Foley, Comment, The Doctor Will See You Now: Medicaid
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States' early movement of Medicaid enrollees into managed care
religiously followed the adage "women and children first." Initial programs
focused on shifting women and children-the so-called "AFDC population"IS-while leaving aged, blind, and disabled Medicaid recipients-the
"SSI population"g-in traditional fee-for-service settings. This segmentation of the Medicaid beneficiary pool was prompted in part by managed care
providers' greater willingness to adapt their commercial plans to serve the
medical needs of the AFDC population-as opposed to the more complex,
intensive, and long-term needs of the SSI population. Today, however,
states have come to realize that for any Medicaid managed care program to
produce significant cost savings, it must include SSI recipients: although the
aged and disabled comprise only twenty-five percent of the Medicaid
population, they account for nearly seventy-five percent of Medicaid
spending.2" As a result, states increasingly seek to incorporate their SSI
populations into developing demonstration projects.2
As states engage in the process of developing Medicaid managed care
programs that will serve SSI beneficiaries, they face a set of thorny design
and implementation issues specific to the aged and disabled populations. 2
Moreover, how a state Medicaid program treats its aged and disabled
Managed Care and Indigent Children, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 93, 112, 125-29 (1997); cf
Marsha Gold et al., MedicaidManaged Care: Lessons from Five States, 15 HEALTH AFF.
153, 153 (1996).
18. See Dana C. Hughes et al., MedicaidManagedCare: Can It Work for Children?,
95 PEDIATRICS 591, 591 (1995). The term "AFDC-related" is often used to refer to those
children and pregnant women who do not qualify for cash welfare assistance under the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, but who are eligible for Medicaid
under one of the Medicaid expansions enacted by Congress in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 606 (1995). This article's use of the term
"AFDC population" will include both of these groups. Of course, this term is itself
anachronistic following abolition of AFDC in 1996 by the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
Nonetheless, since Medicaid eligibility for this group is still tied in part to now-defunct
AFDC eligibility standards, the label is accurate.
19. As part of the Medicaid program, states are required to cover aged, blind, and
disabled persons who are either eligible for the federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
program or, at the state's election, eligible under more restrictive state standards for state
assistance to those groups put in place on January 1, 1972. FURROW ET AL., supranote 18,
at 606.
20. See Katharine R. Levit et al., Data View: NationalHealth Expenditures, 1994,
17 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 205, 224 (1996).
21. See Robert E. Hurley & Sandra J.Tanenbaum, The Medicaid Working Group
Initiative: Lessons and Limits of Learning-by-Doing 18 (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author) (reporting that as of May 1997, 26 states had enrolled SSI beneficiaries to
some degree in managed care).
22. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID MANAGED CARE:
SERVING THE DISABLED CHALLENGES STATE PROGRAMS (1996) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
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recipients may raise legal issues under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), which protects individuals with disabilities against discrimination in
the provision of public benefits and services.23 A potential ADA claim
hovers in the background each time that a state Medicaid agency treats a
disabled recipient differently from other Medicaid recipients. In fact, in
Burns- Vidlak v. Chandler,24 a federal district court held that Hawaii's
Medicaid demonstration project, which excluded blind and disabled Hawaii
residents from eligibility, violated the ADA.25
This article examines issues potentially raised under the ADA by states'
decisions whether and how to include disabled Medicaid recipients in the
massive shift towards Medicaid managed care. Part II briefly examines the
special issues that disabled Medicaid recipients pose with respect to
managed care enrollment. These include issues of cost, quality, access, and
program design and implementation. Part III describes various approaches
that state programs have taken or are proposing to take with respect to the
enrollment of disabled Medicaid recipients in managed care. These
approaches range from simply excluding the SSI population from managed
care enrollment, to developing specialized managed care plans for Medicaid
recipients with special needs, to enrolling disabled recipients in mainstream
Medicaid managed care plans. Finally, Part IV discusses the ADA issues
that each of these approaches may raise and explores how those issues might
be resolved. Part V concludes with suggestions regarding how state
Medicaid officials can avoid ADA liability in developing Medicaid managed
care programs.
Ultimately, because Medicaid is not a single federal program but rather
a multiplicity of state programs (in which variations only increase as states
modify their traditional fee-for-service Medicaid programs toward managed
care), the ADA's implications for Medicaid managed care must be addressed
on a state-by-state and fact-specific basis. Nonetheless, considering how the
ADA's nondiscrimination mandate might be raised in the movement to
Medicaid managed care will help state planners not only avoid potential
liability for an ADA violation, but also think in broad terms about how to
design and implement Medicaid managed care programs in a fashion
responsive to the various needs of the diverse Medicaid population.

23. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994) ("[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity.").
24. 939 F. Supp. 765 (D. Haw. 1996).

25.

Id. at 773.
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II. PRACTICAL ISSUES REGARDING THE INTEGRATION OF PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES INTO MEDICAID MANAGED CARE PROGRAMS

A. Introduction and Terminology
Much ink has been spilled on issues flowing from the states' movement
of their Medicaid populations into managed care settings. 26 Most discussions have focused on the entry of poor women and children into managed
care, since those groups comprised the first large wave of enrollees in
Medicaid managed care projects. 27 As states attempt to develop Medicaid
managed care programs suitable for the SSI population, however, they
encounter a fresh set of questions regarding how to design and implement
programs ensuring optimal quality and access for disabled Medicaid
recipients, while at the same time cutting Medicaid program costs.
Because approximately half the states have already begun experimenting
with enrollment of some disabled Medicaid recipients in managed care, these
questions are not merely speculative; rather, they reflect challenges that state
Medicaid planners face on a daily basis in their attempts to develop a
workable approach. The Medicaid Working Group, a team of health
services experts funded by private foundations, has assisted a number of
states in developing managed care programs for persons with disabilities and
has reported lessons learned from its efforts. 28 Without presenting an indepth analysis of these reports, this section will briefly describe the most
prominent issues influencing a state's approach to the placement of disabled
Medicaid beneficiaries in managed care settings.
Before embarking on this description, however, some clarification of
terminology is necessary. "Disability" and "disabled" are terms with
common, everyday connotations as well as multiple legal definitions. This
multiplicity of meanings easily engenders confusion in discussions such as
this, in which more than one definition is relevant. To be "disabled" for
purposes of SSI eligibility-and, hence, Medicaid eligibility-a person must
be "unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than twelve months., 29 Thus, the cash

26.

See, e.g., Hughes et al., supranote 18; Rotwein et al., supranote 11; Foley, supra

note 17; Impact on the Uninsured,supra note 9.

27.
28.

See supra text accompanying note 18.
See, e.g., Hurley & Tanenbaum, supra note 21; Sandra J. Tanenbaum & Robert

E. Hurley, Disabilityand the Managed Care Frenzy: A CautionaryNote, 14 HEALTH AFF.

213, 216-18 (1995); Robert E. Hurley & Debra A. Draper, Special Plans for Special Persons:
The Elusive Pursuit of Customized Managed Care (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1994); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a) (1997). For
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assistance furnished by SSI is premised on an inability to work to provide
for one's self"
In contrast, the basic definition of "disability" for
purposes of the ADA is a "physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more ... major life activities."'" Thus, the ADA definition,
which entitles a person to protection from disability-based discrimination,
sweeps more broadly than the SSI definition by focusing on functional
impairment with respect to any major life activity, not just work activity.
It seems inevitable, however, that an individual who qualifies for SSI cash
assistance based on disability
3 2 will also be considered an individual with a
disability under the ADA.
In addition, overlap between persons with disabilities and those suffering
from chronic conditions must be considered. Chronic conditions include
long-term, persistent conditions such as arthritis, cancer, depression, heart
disease, and hypertension, to name only a handful, and analyses of cost

purposes of determining disability in children, the Social Security Administration has listed
specific, severe medical conditions encountered in childhood. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P,
App. I (pt. A) (1997). Prior to 1997, a child was deemed disabled if she had (1)one of the
listed impairments or (2) a non-listed impairment that produced a comparably severe
functional impact on the child. See Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 539-41 (1990);
ALBERT P. ZABIN & ALAN BALSAM, DISABILITY HANDBOOK 91 (Supp. 1996). Welfare
reform legislation enacted in 1996 changed the definition of "disability" for children,
requiring that a child have a "medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which
results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
12 months." Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, § 211(a), 110 Stat. 2105, 2188 (1996).
30. See generally Matthew Diller, Entitlementand Exclusion: The Role of Disability
in the Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 361 (1996).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994). The statutory definition also includes persons
who are "regarded as having such an impairment" or who have a history of such an
impairment. Id. § 12102(2)(B), (C).
32. Likewise, an individual who qualifies for SSI based upon blindness would
inevitably be protected by the ADA. Another area of overlap, albeit far less precise, between
SSI (and hence Medicaid) eligibility and ADA protection involves the aged population. The
SSI program seeks to assure a minimum level of income for persons aged 65 or older who
do not have sufficient income and resources to maintain a minimum standard of living. See
RICHARD C. RUSKELL, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
23 (3d ed. 1993). No inquiry into functional capacity is required for persons 65 and older,
but as a practical matter, demographic surveys show that a large percentage of senior citizens
experience impairments that affect their ability to perform day-to-day activities. See
DISABILITY IN AMERICA: TOWARD A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR PREVENTION 193 (Andrew M.
Pope & Alvin R. Tarlov eds., 1991) [hereinafter DISABILITY IN AMERICA]. To the extent that
such impairments substantially limit a major life activity, elderly SSI recipients appear to be
individuals with disabilities for purposes of ADA protection. Thus, a state Medicaid
program's approach to providing coverage for the aged SSI population will also affect
individuals protected by the ADA.

426
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issues and the suitability of managed care often approach these concerns
from the perspective of chronic illness rather than disability.33 One set of
researchers states that, while 100 million Americans had one or more
chronic conditions in 1995, the majority were not disabled by their
condition, but "liv[e] normal lives. 34 Unfortunately, such statements fail
to identify in what sense the word "disabled" is being used. Despite the
imprecision of overlap between the categories of persons with chronic
medical conditions, on the one hand, and of persons with disabilities
(however defined) on the other, the apparently substantial nature of that
overlap35 leads me to include analyses that focus on persons with chronic
conditions in my discussion of the special issues raised by moving Medicaid
recipients with disabilities into managed care settings.
B. Cost Issues
As noted above, the chief motivation behind states' attempts to move
their Medicaid SSI populations into managed care is to rein in the high level
of spending on this subgroup of Medicaid eligibles. Robert Hurley and
Sandra Tanenbaum of the Medicaid Working Group report that, although
persons with disabilities make up only fifteen percent of Medicaid beneficiaries, forty percent of Medicaid spending is attributable to that group.3 6
Thus, for a state to have any hope of controlling overall Medicaid spending,
it must control spending on disabled recipients. Currently, when it comes
to containing health care spending, the "usual suspect"-one turned to with
increasing frequency by Medicaid planners-is managed care. The ability
of managed care programs to contain costs-whether by utilizing a primary
care case management (PCCM) approach or by enrolling individuals in riskbearing plans on a capitated basis-is particularly appealing in the context
of persons with disabilities or chronic conditions, many of whom have
ongoing, intensive medical needs.37
33.

See, e.g., Paul Fishman et al., ChronicCare Costs in Managed Care, 16 HEALTH
Catherine Hoffman et al., Persons with Chronic Conditions: Their
PrevalenceandCosts, 276 JAMA 1473 (1996); Jonathan B. Oberlander, ManagedCareand
MedicareReform, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 595 (1997).
34. See Hoffman et al., supra note 33, at 1477.
35. For example, a table listing the costs of chronic conditions includes the costs of
HIV, back and neck pain, cancer, and diabetes. See Fishman et al., supra note 33, at 244.
Persons with these conditions have been found to be individuals with disabilities under the
ADA. Whether a person with a chronic condition is disabled for purposes of the ADA also
raises issues regarding the effect of available mitigating measures on defining disability-an
issue that has divided courts. See, e.g., Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 762-63 (6th
Cir. 1997). For a discussion of links among chronic diseases, aging, and disability, see
generally DISABILITY IN AMERICA, supra note 32, at 184-213.
36. See Hurley & Tanenbaum, supra note 21, at 1.
37. See Hoffman et al., supranote 33, at 1473-74. Under a PCCM system, Medicaid
AFF. 239 (1997);
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Ironically, however, the same cost-containment imperative that leads
states to view managed care as a potential savior may lead managed care
organizations (MCOs) that contract on a prepaid basis to be wary of
enrolling persons with disabilities. One study of managed care enrollees
with chronic conditions estimated that the costs of medical care for a person
with cancer would be almost ten times greater than the costs for a person
with no chronic condition, that individuals with HIV would cost more than
two times as much, and that individuals with dementia or diabetes would
cost almost two times as much.3" These high costs reflect high utilization
rates, which cause persons with chronic conditions and disabilities to be
undesirable to commercial MCOs seeking to reduce their own costs in an
extremely competitive marketplace.39 In addition, one of the cardinal
principles of managed care cost containment-avoiding costs by keeping
enrollees healthy through the use of preventive health care-is largely
inapplicable to a population that includes many individuals with pre-established, long-term medical needs.4" As a result, adoption of a straightforward capitation methodology that lumps together Medicaid recipients with
disabilities and other Medicaid recipients is likely to lead MCOs to avoid
enrolling persons with high medical costs.4'
Thus, states must grapple with how to reimburse MCOs for enrolling
disabled Medicaid beneficiaries in a way that will both encourage MCOs to
enroll the beneficiaries and represent a cost savings for the state. Some
commentators suggest that capitation payments are desirable because they
allow providers to render services in a more patient-centered fashion, but in
order to attract MCOs, capitation payments would have to be risk-adjusted
42
to reflect the likelihood of increased costs assumed by the MCOs.

enrollees must select a primary care physician who both provides primary care services and
acts as a case manager, coordinating the enrollee's care and authorizing referrals to specialists
and hospitals. See Maren D. Anderson & Peter D. Fox, Lessons Learnedfiom Medicaid
Managed Care Approaches,6 HEALTH AFF. 71, 72-73 (1987). The primary care physician
is typically paid on a fee-for-service basis for medical services rendered and is paid a flat
monthly fee for case management services. See id. at 73. Under a capitated system, a health
maintenance organization (HMO) or other risk-bearing plan is paid a fixed periodic fee per
enrollee (the capitation fee) to provide comprehensive health services for the enrollee. See
id. at 72-73. While states that experimented with Medicaid managed care in the 1980s
typically employed PCCM or other non-risk-bearing systems, most of the recent growth in
Medicaid managed care has moved toward risk-bearing plans. See RAND E. ROSENBLATT
ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 587-88 (1997).
38. Fishman et al., supra note 33, at 245.
39. See Hoffman et al., supra note 33, at 1478.
40. See Oberlander, supra note 33, at 604, 607-08.
41. See GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 50.
42. See Hurley & Tanenbaum, supra note 21, at 15; see also Anderson & Fox, supra
note 37, at 80-81 (discussing issues of risk adjustment and adverse selection). "Risk
adjustment" refers to the practice of modifying a capitation payment to more closely reflect
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Effective risk adjustment of capitation payments, however, must account for
the various levels of risk posed by enrollees with different disabilities, and
here, the diversity of persons with disabilities and their medical needs poses
severe obstacles to establishing an effective, administratively feasible riskadjustment methodology.43 Several states, including Missouri, are attempting to devise systems of capitated payments adjusted by either a limited set
of diagnosis-based factors or some other variation, but these efforts are in
their infancy and remain largely untested." State Medicaid programs seek
to move disabled enrollees into managed care in an attempt to shift the risk
of high utilization and costs onto MCOs, but the states ultimately must
compensate MCOs for assuming that risk. Devising a payment methodology
to do so rationally, fairly, and in a cost- and quality-conscious fashion
continues to be a major stumbling block on the road toward managed care
for persons with disabilities.
C. Need for Specialist Care
Another centerpiece of managed care cost containment-reliance on
primary care providers as gatekeepers-is also likely to prove problematic
for the enrollment of persons with disabilities in Medicaid managed care
plans.4 5 Cost savings accrue from the use of a gatekeeper system by
limiting referrals to more expensive, specialized care, but many persons with
disabilities or chronic conditions have greater than average needs for
specialist referrals. 4 6 Indeed, outside the managed care context, a specialist
may often be the primary care provider for a person with a chronic
condition. Consequently, a turf battle in the managed care invasion is
heating up over who-specialists or generalists-should provide routine care
for the approximately 100 million Americans with chronic conditions.47
Specialists argue that reliance on generalist gatekeepers is not in the
patient's best interest because specialized knowledge is often required to
attend to the nuances of a patient's chronic condition. 48 Generalists answer
that their care can maximize patient well-being by taking a more holistic

the anticipated cost of covering an individual enrollee. States have also sought to decrease
MCOs' financial disincentives to enroll persons with disabilities by sharing the financial risk
of high-cost cases with the MCOs and by establishing "risk corridors" that reimburse MCOs
for some portion of any losses, but also require the MCOs to return any profits over a certain
level. See GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 48.
43. Cf Hurley & Tanenbaum, supra note 21, at 12-13.
44. See id. at 6-9.
45. See Nancy Ann Jeffrey, Doctors Battle Over Who Treats Chronically lll, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 11, 1996, at BI.
46. See Oberlander, supra note 33, at 605.
47. Jeffrey, supra note 45, at BI.
48. Id.; see also Oberlander, supra note 33, at 605.
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view of a patient's entire condition.49 Compounding this discord, MCOs
and specialized providers caring for persons with disabilities and chronic
illnesses often profoundly distrust each other."
Not surprisingly, much of this disagreement over the appropriate
primary care providers for persons with chronic conditions boils down to an
issue of money, from the perspective of both individual providers and
MCOs, and, thus, by extension the state Medicaid plans that contract with
MCOs to provide coverage. As noted above, one of the fundamental
reasons for higher Medicaid spending on persons with disabilities is their
heightened need for specialized care. Therefore, from a managed care
perspective, disabled individuals particularly need a gatekeeper's care
management and coordination of services. Indeed, some argue that managed
care could provide persons with disabilities better coordinated care, resulting
in less fragmented and more effective treatment.5' From the perspectives
of specialized providers (who fear the loss of access to part of their income)
and persons with disabilities facing managed care enrollment (who fear the
loss of access to trusted providers), the picture looks very different. In 1996
the American Medical Association called on managed care plans to permit
chronically ill persons to visit specialists as their "principal care" physicians, 5 2 and some commercial HMOs are relaxing restrictions on access to
specialist care. 53 These moves, however, predictably result in greater
costs-a result that state Medicaid agencies are unlikely to embrace as they
contemplate moving disabled Medicaid recipients into managed care.
D. Need for Broader Range of Services
While persons with disabilities generally have a greater need for
specialized medical care, many also need nonmedical care to maximize their
independence and functional capacity, or simply to support their daily
existence. HMOs, however, still adhere to a "medical model" approach to
care delivery. 4 This approach is embodied in part by the limitation that
only "medically necessary" services are covered. MCOs' definitions of
medical necessity vary, but some focus on whether the service will improve
or restore function. This type of medical necessity threshold for coverage
is biased toward providing curative care, rather than meeting the maintenance or developmental needs of many persons with disabilities.55
Moreover, most managed care plans do not cover custodial care provided in

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See Jeffrey, supra note 45, at B 1.
See Hurley & Tanenbaum, supra note 21, at 13.
See Tanenbaum & Hurley, supra note 28, at 215-16.
See Jeffrey, supra note 45, at BI.
See id. at B6.
See Hurley & Tanenbaum, supra note 21, at 20.
Id.; GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 36-37.
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nursing homes or other long-term care facilities-care that, by definition, is
provided for persons who are disabled.5 6 Likewise, by focusing on
restricting enrollees' choice of service providers, most MCOs have not
formed relationships with community-based providers of health-related
services on whom many persons with disabilities traditionally have relied.5 7
For example, in the case of developmentally disabled children, managed
care plans enrolling Medicaid beneficiaries have been criticized for limiting
coverage of therapy to an amount that allows the children to achieve only
a minimal level of functioning, rather than providing coverage sufficient to
maximize their developmental capacity.5"
This disparity between the service needs of persons with chronic
illnesses and disabilities and the array of services typically covered by
MCOs presents another hurdle for states seeking to move their disabled
Medicaid population into managed care settings. These states face several
options, each of which is problematic: (1) find an MCO willing to provide
a specialized plan covering the broad range of services (medical and
nonmedical) required by persons with disabilities; 9 (2) enroll disabled
Medicaid recipients in a mainstream managed care plan and provide
additional services not covered by the plan through fee-for-service "carveouts";6 or (3) simply enroll disabled Medicaid recipients in a mainstream

56. Cf Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 336 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[O]nly disabled
persons are institutionalized.").
57. See Hurley & Tanenbaum, supranote 21, at 20; Tanenbaum & Hurley, supra note
28, at 214-15. The exception to this rule is the "social HMO" model, which provides both
medical and social services in return for a capitation fee. See Theresa Defino, Social HMOs:
Ten Years and Counting, HMO MAG., May/June 1995, at 72, 72-73. To date, this model has
been used primarily with the elderly Medicare population and is touted as an alternative to
institutionalization for persons with significant medical and social needs. See generallyid.
58. See Peter T. Kilborn, Disabled Children FeelBudget Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24,
1997, at A7.
59. For a description of Michigan's use of such a plan for children with chronic
illnesses, see generally Marilynn Smyth et al., The Ups and Downsfor Childrenwith Chronic
Illnesses, 3 MANAGED CARE Q. 91 (1995).
60. A state program that requires Medicaid recipients to enroll in HMOs with
comprehensive benefit packages could nonetheless carve out certain services (for example,
substance abuse treatment or mental health services) to be provided either on a fee-for-service
basis or through a specialized risk-based plan. By the same token, a state that still relies
primarily on fee-for-service reimbursement (perhaps through a PCCM arrangement) could
contract with a risk-based plan to provide specialized services on a carve-out basis. For
example, Iowa's plan requires AFDC recipients to enroll in a PCCM program, but has
specialized plans for mental health and substance abuse treatment. IOWA DEP'T OF HUM.
SERVS., IOWA'S APPROACH TO MANAGED HEALTH CARE IN MEDICAID.

Nearly all Medicaid

recipients, including the SSI population, are required to receive mental health and substance
abuse services through these plans. Id.

1998]

DISABILITY DISCRIMINA TION ISSUES

managed care plan without providing any further coverage and accept the
risk of inadequate service.
E. Additional ProgramDesign and Implementation Issues
Ultimately, a state that decides to shift its disabled Medicaid recipients
into a managed care setting must decide whether to do so by enrolling them
in one or more plans specially designed for their needs or by mainstreaming
them-enrolling them in the same managed care arrangement as the rest of
its Medicaid population. As discussed, one issue arising in the debate over
mainstream versus specialized plans is the range of covered services in light
of enrollees' service needs. A closely related question is how to account for
the different service use patterns and cost experiences of persons with
disabilities as compared to other Medicaid recipients."
Yet even to
compare persons with disabilities with any other group oversimplifies the
issue: the disabled are an extremely heterogeneous group, with each
subgroup having its own service needs, use patterns, and cost experiences.
Consequently, developing a single plan that would respond adequately to the
needs of such a diverse group is a formidable assignment. States could
develop specialized plans for subgroups within the disabled population;
however, some of these subgroups would be too small to make a specialized
plan economically viable.62
In addition, MCOs and state Medicaid officials are inexperienced in
developing and implementing these types of specialized programs, which
creates a concern that disabled Medicaid recipients may be enrolled in
plans-whether specialized or mainstream-that are neither equipped nor
prepared to care for them adequately.63 Until approaches to the questions
of service coverage, specialist access, and risk adjustment, among others,'
are developed and tested, the resistance to moving disabled Medicaid
recipients into managed care settings is likely to persist.

61. See Hurley & Tanenbaum, supra note 21, at 11-12.
62. Id.
63. Id.at 19-20; see also Anderson & Fox, supra note 37, at 80; cf Oberlander,
supra note 33, at 617 (stating that "analyses of risk plans that discontinued their Medicare
contracts have raised doubts about HMO's abilities to care for the disabled" and that "[o]ne
of the primary variables associated with HMO exit from Medicare was the percentage of
disabled patients enrolled in a health plan").
64. An additional design issue faced by states is how to deal with Medicaid recipients
who are also eligible for Medicare, either because they are 65 or older or permanently
disabled-the so-called "dually eligible." The inclusion of dual eligibles in mandatory
Medicaid managed care programs is problematic because Medicaid and Medicare have
requirements regarding enrollment, coverage, and enrollee choice, for example, that often
conflict or overlap. See GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 29-31.
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III. MEDICAID MANAGED CARE FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES:
STATE APPROACHES

Having considered in the abstract some of the issues that states face as
they attempt to shift their disabled Medicaid population into managed care
settings, it may now be instructive to examine how some states have actually
responded (or failed to respond) to those issues. This part describes how a
number of states are dealing with their disabled Medicaid population in the
move to managed care.65 Though the following discussion arranges state
efforts into a rough classification scheme, the complexity of these programs
and the wide variety, of state responses ultimately make comprehensive
classification impossible.
A. Exclusion of SSf Populationfrom Medicaid Managed Care
As noted, when states began experimenting with Medicaid managed
care, most states shifted only their AFDC populations into managed care,
leaving their SSI populations in traditional fee-for-service programs.66
Despite states' current interest in expanding Medicaid managed care to SSI
recipients, some states still adhere to an AFDC-only approach. For
example, both Mississippi" and North Dakota 6 have PCCM programs
that mandate enrollment of their AFDC populations but exclude their SSI
populations. Similarly, Rhode Island's "RIte Care" program, which requires
recipients to enroll in a prepaid health plan, is open to all AFDC recipients,
pregnant women, and children under age six whose income is below 250%
of the federal poverty level, but is not available to SSI recipients.69

65. The states discussed were chosen for illustrative purposes only, and the
information in this part was obtained through telephone interviews with state Medicaid
officials during the summer of 1997 and from published materials available at that time.
66. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
67. Telephone Interview with Bo Bowen, Mississippi Division of Medicaid (July 17,
1997); Health Care Fin. Admin., National Summary of State Medicaid Managed Care
Programs75 (June 30, 1995) <http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/omc3.htm> [hereinafter HCFA
Summary].
68. Telephone Interview with Tom Solberg, Human Services Medical Division, North
Dakota Department of Human Services Medical Division (July 17, 1997); HCFA Summary,
supra note 67, at 86.
69. Telephone Interview with Ron Ek, Office of Managed Care Medicaid Agency,
Rhode Island Department of Human Services (July 17, 1997); Health Care Fin. Admin.,
Rhode Island Statewide Health Reform DemonstrationFact Sheet (visited Jan. 22, 1998)
<http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/rifact.htm>; HCFA Summary, supra note 67, at 185-86.
Rhode Island is also developing a separate section 1115 demonstration proposal targeting
disabled individuals, including the mentally retarded. Id. at 186.
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B. Dual Track Programs
An approach adopted by some states as they evolve beyond an AFDConly design is to maintain their AFDC-only program while adding a second
program (or set of programs) specifically for their SSI population or some
subgroup(s) of disabled Medicaid recipients. Wisconsin and Indiana provide
examples of this approach. Wisconsin's "Medicaid Managed Care" program
enrolls the state's AFDC population in prepaid managed care plans,7" while
two separate programs have been developed for disabled Medicaid
recipients."
The "Primary Provider Program" is a voluntary PCCM
program for disabled SSI recipients under the age of sixty-five,7 2 and the
"Independent Care" (ICare) demonstration project allows disabled SSI
recipients over the age of fifteen to enroll voluntarily in a managed care
plan formed by a joint venture between an HMO and a community
vocational training agency." The ICare program also responds to concerns
about disrupting provider-patient relationships by allowing potential
enrollees to identify the providers they have been seeing and by inviting
those providers to join ICare's network.74 Similarly, Indiana's original
Medicaid managed care program, "Hoosier Healthwise," covers only the
AFDC population; 75 however, enrollment in a separate, voluntary, riskbased managed care program for persons with disabilities and chronic
illnesses was scheduled to begin in 1997.76
C. Single Track Programs
Rather than add separate managed care programs for disabled Medicaid
populations, some states have simply cast more broadly the eligibility net for
their Medicaid managed care programs by allowing SSI recipients to enroll
on either a voluntary or mandatory basis. This approach is least problematic
when a state chooses voluntary enrollment in a PCCM program, for it then
sidesteps the thorny issue of risk-adjusted capitation payments and may also
minimize the involuntary disruption of provider-patient relationships. For

70.

HCFA Summary, supra note 67, at 144.

71.

Telephone Interview with Mike Fox, Wisconsin Bureau of Health Care Financing

(July 23, 1997); HCFA Summary, supra note 67, at 146-47, 194-95.
72. HCFA Summary, supra note 67, at 146-47.

73. Id. at 194-95.
74. Id. at 195.
75. Telephone Interview with Sharon Steadman, Family and Social Services
Administration, Indiana Office of Medicaid Policy and Planning (July 25, 1997); HCFA
Summary, supra note 67, at 47.
76. OFFICE OF MEDICAID
ADMIN., VOLUNTARY

POLICY AND PLANNING, IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS.
RISK-BASED MANAGED CARE FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES AND

CHRONIC ILLNESSES: PROGRAM PLANNING OVERVIEW

(1997).
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example, West Virginia's "Physician Assured Access System" is a PCCM
program that enrolls AFDC recipients on a mandatory basis and non-aged
and non-institutionalized SSI recipients on a voluntary basis, providing the
same coverage to all enrollees. 7 Kentucky's new "Health Care Partnership
Plan," by contrast, is more ambitious. It requires all Medicaid recipients,
except those residing in long-term care facilities, to enroll in one of eight
regional prepaid managed care partnerships.7
In order to minimize
disruption of relationships, however, Kentucky allows SSI beneficiaries
to
79
continue using their existing care providers through the plan.
D. New York: A Hybrid Approach
As the most ambitious Medicaid managed care effort to date, in both
size and complexity, New York's recently approved proposal embodies a
combination of the foregoing approaches."0 In one sense, it represents a
single-track mainstream approach in that, except for defined subgroups of
the Medicaid population, all New York Medicaid recipients-including the
SSI population-will be required to enroll in risk-based managed care
plans.8 ' The exempted subgroups, comprised primarily of persons with
disabilities or chronic diseases, are handled in two different ways. Persons
with diagnoses requiring intensive case management (individuals with HIV
or AIDS, adults who are seriously and persistently mentally ill, and children
who are severely emotionally disturbed) will be enrolled in risk-based
"Special Needs Plans," thus reflecting a separate managed care track for this
subgroup.12 In contrast, persons requiring nursing home care will continue
to receive services on a fee-for-service basis, 3 and persons with chronic
medical conditions whose existing specialists do not participate in a
managed care network and persons with complex referral needs may apply
for an exemption from managed care enrollment.8 4 It appears that the
challenges in designing managed care coverage for these individuals proved
insurmountable for New York Medicaid policy planners.

77. Telephone Interview with Ellen Cannon, Bureau of Medical Services, West
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (July 14, 1997); HCFA Summary,
supra note 67, at 149. Each primary physician is paid a monthly fee of $3 for each patient
whose care he or she manages. Id.

78. Health Care Fin. Admin., KentuckyStatewideHealthReform DemonstrationFact
Sheet (visited Jan. 22, 1998) <http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaidikyfact.htm>.
79. Id.; Telephone Interview with Barbara Hadley Smith, Director of Communications, Kentucky Cabinet for Health Services (Aug. 6, 1997).
80. See Largest-EverMedicaidWaiver, supra note 1.
81. See N. Y. DemonstrationFact Sheet, supra note 3.
82. See Special Needs Plans,supra note 5.
83. See Largest-EverMedicaidWaiver, supra note 1.
84.

See Special Needs Plans,supra note 5.
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IV. WHAT'S THE ADA GOT TO Do WITH IT?

Title II of the ADA prohibits public entities from discriminating based
on disability in the provision of services, benefits, and programs.8 5 This
nondiscrimination mandate originated in section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973,86 which prohibited entities receiving federal funding from
discriminating against persons based upon handicap, and the ADA
broadened 87 the mandate to apply to all public entities, regardless of their
receipt of federal funds.88 State Medicaid agencies clearly fall within the
definition of a public entity, and hence are subject to Title II's prohibition
against discrimination.89 Although Title II's spare statutory language
provides minimal guidance as to the types of actions prohibited, regulations
promulgated by the Attorney General provide additional direction9" and
should be given "controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
clearly contrary to the statute." 9' In sum, Title II of "[t]he ADA does not
permit segregation of individuals with disabilities in the provision of public
services, nor does it permit the provision of benefits to individuals with
disabilities different from those provided to other benefits recipients."92
93 provides a shining example of
One case, Burns-Vidlak v. Chandler,
how a state Medicaid agency can run afoul of Title II when moving its
Medicaid population into managed care.
In Burns-Vidlak, Hawaii's
Department of Human Services (DHS) created the QUEST program as a
way to integrate into a managed care setting several existing medical

85.

See supranote 23 for the text of Title II's general prohibition against discrimina-

tion.
86. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)).
87. See Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 300-01 (3d Cir. 1994).
88. Title II's definition of "public entity" includes "any department, agency, special
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12131 (1)(b) (1994 & Supp. 11995). Because Medicaid is ajoint federal-state program that
receives federal funding, state Medicaid agencies are also subject to section 504. See, e.g.,
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 290 (1985). Because of its relative youth, the ADA has
yet to generate extensive case interpretation of Title II;however, courts look to case law
decided under section 504 for assistance in interpreting Title II. See Does 1-5 v. Chandler,
83 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 1996).
89. See. e.g., Anderson v. Department of Public Welfare, No. Civ.A 97-3808, 1998
WL 154654, at *5 n.8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 1998) (noting that Pennsylvania's Department of
Public Welfare, the agency responsible for administering the state's Medicaid program,
conceded its status as a public entity).
90. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (1996).
91. See Does 1-5, 83 F.3d at 1153 (quoting United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822,
834 (1984)).
92. Weaver v. New Mexico Human Servs. Dep't, 945 P.2d 70, 74 (N.M. 1997).
93. 939 F. Supp. 765 (D. Haw. 1996).
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assistance programs (including Medicaid) that had been operating in Hawaii
on a fee-for-service basis.94 The QUEST program, instituted under waivers
from HCFA,95 adopted less stringent financial eligibility requirements than
the state's Medicaid program9 6 in an attempt to provide coverage to a
larger portion of the state's low-income population, but it expressly excluded
the aged, blind, and disabled population from coverage. Persons falling into
this group, however, could continue to receive health coverage under
Hawaii's traditional Medicaid program if they satisfied its more stringent
financial prerequisites.
The plaintiffs in Burns- Vidlak were disabled persons who would have
qualified for QUEST under that program's more lenient financial requirements, but were excluded because they were disabled. 97 In addition, they
were denied Medicaid benefits because they failed to meet Medicaid's
financial tests. 9 The plaintiffs brought suit claiming that their exclusion
from QUEST was based solely on their disabilities in violation of section
504 and Title II, and they moved for summary judgment.99 The court
found that the plaintiffs had been categorically denied coverage under
QUEST solely by reason of their disabilities and granted them partial
summary judgment.' ° Furthermore, the court rejected arguments by DHS
that any discrimination had not been "solely" by reason of disability, that
the HCFA waiver effectively insulated the state from liability under
disability discrimination laws, and' that QUEST's exclusion of disabled
persons fell within a "necessity" exception contained in the regulations
implementing Title I."01
No other published decision has considered the ADA implications of a
shift to Medicaid managed care; 0 2 however, it seems readily apparent that

94. Id. at 767.
95. Waivers were granted to QUEST as a research and demonstration project under
section 1115 of the Social Security Act. See id.
96. The financial tests for QUEST eligibility allowed recipients to earn up to 300%
of the federal poverty level, but they imposed no asset limitation. Id. To be eligible for

Medicaid, Hawaii residents could not earn more than 100% of the federal poverty level, and
their assets could not exceed a per-family asset limitation. Id.
97.

See id.

98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 766.

100. Id. at 771-73.
101. Id.
102. As this article went to press, the district court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted partial summaryjudgment to disabled plaintiffs enrolled in a mandatory
Medicaid managed care program on their claim that the state Medicaid agency failed to
ensure that contracting providers complied with ADA regulations on physical accessibility.
Anderson v. Department of Public Welfare, No. Civ.A. 97-3808, 1998 WL 154654 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 1, 1998). This litigation highlights how issues of physical accessibility may also arise
when disabled Medicaid recipients are enrolled in managed care plans.
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a state's differential treatment of its disabled Medicaid population, as
compared to its AFDC population, should raise a yellow flag signaling,
"Caution, potential ADA violation ahead." That is not to say, however, that
in order to avoid violating the ADA in pursuing managed care options a
state must treat its disabled Medicaid population identically to its AFDC
population. The balance of this part fleshes out the analytical countours of
how Title II might be applied to the different approaches that state Medicaid
programs are pursuing with respect to their SSI populations." 3 As such,
it is organized parallel to Part III's description of these approaches.
A. Exclusion of SS1 Populationfrom Medicaid Managed Care
A state Medicaid agency that creates a new managed care program
permitting enrollment by its AFDC population, while excluding its disabled
SSI population, would seem to be facially discriminating, consistent with the
court's reasoning in Burns- Vidlak. 10 4 In such a case, the state fails to
provide a benefit-namely, participation in the managed care program-solely on the basis of disability.' °5 Indeed, the state could be
viewed as segregating Medicaid recipients with disabilities in providing
Medicaid coverage. °6 Yet the conclusion that an ADA violation exists is
not foregone, because a state implementing an AFDC-only Medicaid
managed care program may raise several possible defenses.
First, a state may argue that exclusion from the program is not based on
disability, but on SSI status. SSI status (the argument could go) correlates
statistically with greater costs and more complex medical needs-factors that
cause SSI recipients to be poor candidates for managed care enrollment-and is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for exclusion. Moreover,
a state may argue that the program excludes disabled and nondisabled SSI
recipients equally from participation.
The state's argument is weakened, however, because the factors
identified by the state (greater costs and complex needs) flow directly from
103. Because of the highly fact-specific nature of a full analysis of the ADA's
applicability to a particular state program, such an analysis is outside the scope of this article.
My purpose here is simply to suggest generally how such an analysis might proceed.
104. See 939 F. Supp. at 771-73.
105. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.135(b)(1)(i) (1996) ("A public entity, in providing any aid,
benefit, or service, may not.., on the basis of disability... [d]eny a qualified individual
with a disability the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service
.... ") As a practical matter, persons with disabilities may not always view managed care
enrollment as beneficial when compared to continuing fee-for-service Medicaid coverage.
Hence, they may not assert a violation of the ADA in such a case. Practical considerations,
as opposed to legal issues, are discussed in Part V.
106. See Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 333 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[T]he ADA and its
attendant regulations clearly define unnecessarysegregation as a form of illegal discrimination
against the disabled.").
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health status indicators correlative with disability. In other words, these
factors, while facially nondiscriminatory, may simply be a proxy for
disability.'0 7 As a result, even if the use of SSI status as a disqualifying
factor is not an "'overt denial[] of equal treatment of individuals with
disabilities,""0 8 a disabled plaintiff could argue that the state's use of SSI
status "tend[s] to screen out an individual with a disability ... from fully
and equally enjoying" the state's Medicaid managed care program in
violation of Title II's implementing regulations.'09
The same regulation that invalidates the use of "screening out"
eligibility criteria, however, provides a defense when "such criteria can be
shown to be necessary for the provision of the ... program." ' ' 0 A state
might argue (as Hawaii did in Burns-Vidlak)"'. that the unwillingness of
private managed care firms to contract for enrollment of SSI recipients on
a capitated basis necessitates exclusion of the SSI population. The strength
of this argument depends heavily on the type of managed care program
adopted by the state. Specifically, this argument seems viable only when
the state has chosen risk-based contracting for its managed care program.
Even with risk-based contracting, however, the possibility of risk-adjusted
capitation payments or reinsurance protection might enable the state to
include SSI recipients without driving away managed care providers.
Moreover, states' creative efforts to develop their own public-private
partnerships to provide managed care enrollment for nondisabled and
disabled recipients alike belie this "necessity" defense." 12
Even if exclusion of a state's SSI population is not necessary for the
operation of its Medicaid managed care program, a state could argue that
SSI recipients' continued access to fee-for-service medicine is necessary to3
provide them with coverage that will effectively meet their health needs. 1
Specifically, a state could highlight SSI recipients' special needs for access

107. This issue will arise any time that a state Medicaid program treats SSI recipients
differently from AFDC recipients.
108. See Burns- Vidlak, 939 F. Supp. at 773 & n.9 (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 App. A
(1994) (Section Analysis of 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (1994))).
109. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (1996).
110. Id.
111. See 939 F. Supp. at 772.
112. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 70-74 for a description of such a
partnership in Wisconsin.
113. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv), which provides that a public entity may not, on
the basis of disability,
[p]rovide different or separate aids, benefits, or services to individuals with disabilities
or to any class of individuals with disabilities than is [sic] provided to others unless such
action is necessary to provide qualified individuals with disabilities with aids, benefits,
or services that are as effective as those provided to others.
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to specialists and a wide range of benefits" 4 as rendering managed care
enrollment less effective in meeting the health needs of the SSI population,
as compared to the AFDC population. Again, the strength of this argument
may depend on whether the state has chosen a PCCM or risk-based
contracting approach for its AFDC population. Moreover, the regulations
make clear that, even when a state permissibly operates a separate program
for disabled individuals, those individuals must be allowed the opportunity
to participate in the state's nonseparate program if they so desire." 5 Thus,
a state could not avail itself of a "separate, but as effective"' "6 defense as
long as it categorically excludes all SSI recipients from its Medicaid
managed care program." 7
B. Dual Track Programs
By and large, the arguments just laid out will also apply when a state
Medicaid agency enrolls its AFDC population in one managed care program
and its SSI population or some subgroup of Medicaid recipients with
disabilities in a separate managed care program. New York's "Special
Needs Plans" for individuals with specific diagnoses requiring intensive case
Under this approach, a state may
management exemplify this approach.'
be able to take advantage of the "separate, but as effective" defense offered
by Title II regulations" 9 if (1) the separate program is designed to address
the special needs of the disabled population served and to optimize their
health outcomes,120 and (2) the targeted population is "still given the right

114. See discussion supra Part II.
115. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(2).
116. See id.§ 35.130(b)(1)(iv).
117. The state might also attempt to argue that its Medicaid program for the AFDC
population and its Medicaid program for the SSI population should be viewed as separate
programs, which the ADA would not require to have identical benefits. This argument relies
on Does 1-5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1996). which upheld Hawaii's imposition
of a one-year limit on General Assistancebenefits for needy disabled persons notwithstanding
the state's continued provision of benefits of unlimited duration to needy families with
dependent children. In light of the Medicaid program's creation through a single federal
statute, its historical operation as a unified program, and the statutory requirement that states
participating in Medicaid provide coverage for both the AFDC and SSI populations, a
"separate programs" argument in the Medicaid context would appear quite weak. Cf.Weaver
v. New Mexico Human Servs. Dep't, 945 P.2d 70, 75 (N.M. 1997) (finding New Mexico's
General Assistance program to be a single program of public benefits and invalidating a oneyear durational limit for disabled adults).
118. See supra notes 5, 81, 82, 84 and accompanying text.
119. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(l)(iv).
120. Also relevant is 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(l)(iii), which prohibits a state from
"[p]rovid[ing] a qualified individual with a disability with an aid, benefit, or service that is
not as effective in affording equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same
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to 'opt out' of the separate program and participate instead in the general
In contrast, a state would have a much weaker
population program."''
argument for separate programs if a separate managed care plan for its
goal being
disabled Medicaid population was designed with the overriding
22
cost-containment, rather than effective health coverage.
C. Single Track Programs
States that choose to enroll their Medicaid SSI population in a managed
care program along with their AFDC population would seem to avoid the
charge of discrimination on the basis of disability, but some potential for
ADA claims may lurk in the background of even these single track
programs. A state that makes managed care enrollment voluntary on the
part of SSI recipients appears to be in the strongest position legally, for by
allowing persons with disabilities the option either to enroll in the managed
care program or to remain in the traditional fee-for-service realm, the state
allows each individual to choose the program he or she deems most
effective in providing for specific health needs. The only difference in
treatment is that the state gives persons with disabilities greater
choice-including the choice to integrate-and it is difficult to imagine a
court finding that such an approach violates the ADA.
In contrast, a state Medicaid program that mandates enrollment of its
SSI population in the same managed care program as its AFDC population
cannot be said to be treating any Medicaid recipient differently based on
disability. Nonetheless, such a program could well face an ADA challenge.
Disabled Medicaid recipients could argue that mandatory enrollment in a
managed care program has an adverse disparate impact on them, thereby
violating the ADA. In sum, they might claim that the limitation on
referrals, disruption of established provider-patient relationships, and focus
on preventive and acute care rather than maintenance and rehabilitative care
all cause disproportionately greater harm to persons with disabilities.
Although disparate impact claims are sometimes cognizable under the
ADA, the foregoing argument may not succeed. In Alexander v. Choate,123 the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a reduction in the
number of days that Tennessee's Medicaid program would pay for inpatient
hospital care. 24 According to the plaintiffs, this reduction violated section

benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement as that provided to others." Id.
121. Burns-Vidlak v. Chandler, 939 F. Supp. 765, 773 (D. Haw. 1996).
122. An example might be if a state contracted on a risk-adjusted capitated basis with
a single MCO to provide coverage only to the state's disabled Medicaid population (thereby
establishing a separate benefit for the disabled), but did not include in that contract special
provisions with respect to access to specialists and the range of benefits covered.

123.

469 U.S. 287 (1985).

124.

Id. at 306.
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504 of the Rehabilitation Act because it would have a disproportionate
adverse impact on persons with disabilities due to their greater need for
medical care.1 5 Though the Court accepted the plaintiffs' argument that
Congress intended section 504 to reach at least some cases of disparate
impact discrimination, it concluded that a fourteen-day limitation on
inpatient coverage did not deprive persons with disabilities of "meaningful
access" to the benefits of the state's Medicaid program. 6 Because the
Court viewed the benefit offered by Tennessee's Medicaid program as a
specific amount of inpatient coverage, rather than as "adequate health care,"
the plaintiffs' access to that benefit was identical to the access enjoyed by
nondisabled Medicaid recipients. 127 The Alexander decision thus saps
much of the strength from "disparate impact" arguments raised against the
mandatory enrollment of disabled Medicaid recipients in a mainstream
managed care program.
Yet disabled recipients' concern about the impact of enrollment in a
mainstream plan might nonetheless find some legal relief if what they seek
is not exemption from enrollment, but instead accommodations made for
their special medical needs. Courts have interpreted Title II as requiring a
state agency to provide reasonable accommodations for persons with
disabilities in order to ensure those persons meaningful access to the
agency's benefits and services. A court may require an agency to take
modest "affirmative steps to ensure that access is meaningful.' 28 While
the reasonableness of a proposed modification of a state program is a fact
question, 29 disabled Medicaid recipients might argue that, if they are to
be required to enroll in mainstream capitated plans, the state agency should
accommodate their needs by, for example, (1) providing them with special
assistance in enrollment, (2) requiring contracting MCOs to have disability
counselors and advocates on staff,'3 ° or (3) allowing disabled recipients
standing access to specialist care without requiring referrals from primary
care gatekeepers.
In conclusion, despite the finding of liability in Burns-Vidlak, the ADA
does not appear to erect an insurmountable hurdle to any of the foregoing
125. Id. at 290.
126. Id. at 290-303.
127. Id. at 303.
128. See Mariiol A. v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also
Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1485-86 (9th Cir. 1996) (considering reasonable
modifications to Hawaii's rabies quarantine regulation in light of the regulation's discriminatory effect on visually impaired persons in need of guide dogs); Concerned Parents to Save
Dreher Park Ctr. v. City of W. Palm Beach, 846 F. Supp. 986, 990 (S.D. Fla. 1994)
(discussing reasonable modifications to city's recreational programs).
129. See Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1486.
130. See GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 38-41; cf.Tugg v. Towey, 864 F. Supp.
1201, 1210-11 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that Title II requires the state to provide mental
health counselors with sign language ability and training in the needs of the deaf).
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approaches to shifting Medicaid populations into managed care settings.
Nor, however, is the ADA irrelevant to how state Medicaid agencies handle
their disabled populations in the movement to Medicaid managed care: an
agency that fails to consider the implications of the ADA as discussed could
easily violate that statute. Part V highlights some of the factors that state
Medicaid planners should consider in order to avoid ADA liability.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR MEDICAID PLANNERS

The most fundamental piece of advice for state Medicaid planners is that
the design of Medicaid managed care programs is subject to the nondiscrimination mandate of the ADA, as illustrated by Burns- Vidlak. Consequently,
planners should act with their "heads up." To do so, planners should act
with conscious regard for both the legal issues suggested by the analysis in
Part IV and practical factors that may influence the likelihood of litigation.
To begin, many may question whether-regardless of the technical
(il)legality of a Medicaid plan that requires the AFDC population to enroll
in a managed care plan while allowing the SSI population to continue
receiving care on a fee-for-service basis-any disabled Medicaid recipient
would file suit seeking entry into a mainstream managed care program.
Many persons with disabilities are wary of managed care, and state officials
may believe (with some justification) that many disabled Medicaid recipients
would prefer to be treated differently from the AFDC population in this
regard. The likelihood that disabled Medicaid recipients or their advocates
will sue may depend on a number of factors: most importantly, the
perceived quality and accessibility of medical care received by those
individuals in the state's traditional Medicaid program.
A person with a disability who has encountered access problems because
of physicians' unwillingness to treat Medicaid recipients under the
traditional program will be more likely to seek entry to a managed care
program that guarantees access, at least to primary care providers. 3 '
Similarly, disabled enrollees in a state that has enacted stringent limitations
on the amount, duration, and scope of Medicaid-covered services in its
traditional program 3 2 may see managed care as expanding the level of
medical services covered. Looking at the flip side of this coin, it also seems
logical that the type of managed care program adopted by a state Medicaid
program could influence the likelihood of suit. For example, some disabled
recipients may view a PCCM system as less prone to producing underservice
than a system in which the MCO and providers face financial incentives to
limit services; those individuals might be willing to sue to enroll in a PCCM
system purely for its guarantee of physician access.
131. Cf Tanenbaum & Hurley, supra note 28, at 215-16.
132. Cf Alexander, 469 U.S. at 289, 302-06 (addressing Tennessee's reduction of
coverage for hospital inpatient care).
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Another scenario in which suit under the ADA seems likely is when a
state, as part of a Medicaid waiver program, relaxes financial eligibility
criteria for children and pregnant women enrolling in a managed care
program, but maintains more restrictive financial criteria for its traditional
Medicaid program. In this scenario, illustrated by Hawaii's QUEST
program in Burns-Vidlak, some disabled persons will be excluded both from
the managed care program (because of disability) and from the traditional
Medicaid program (because of financial status). 133 Accordingly, state
planners should be careful not to subject persons with disabilities to a more
stringent set of financial standards than those applied to other subgroups of
the Medicaid population.
Ultimately, the challenge for state planners as they develop programs to
move Medicaid enrollees into managed care settings is to develop programs
that integrate disabled Medicaid enrollees as much as possible, while
simultaneously responding to those individuals' distinctive health care needs.
Because of the issues posed by enrolling disabled persons in managed care
programs and because of the resulting need to develop programs responsive
to those needs, it may not be in the best health interests of persons with
disabilities to mandate exactly equal treatment immediately. Viewed in this
light, the states' desire to move disabled Medicaid recipients into managed
care illustrates what Martha Minow calls "the dilemma of difference."
Specifically, she asks: "[W]hen does treating people differently emphasize
their differences and stigmatize or hinder them on that basis? [A]nd when
does treating people the same become insensitive to their difference and
likely to stigmatize or hinder them on that basis?"' 34

Certainly, if the goal of the Medicaid program is to enable certain
categories of poor persons to receive quality medical care, state Medicaid
planners cannot and should not ignore the ways in which the medical
coverage needs of Medicaid recipients with disabilities differ from the needs
of non-disabled recipients. Yet to recognize and act upon difference in a
legal regime proscribing most different treatment based on disability places
state planners in the position of balancing on a high wire: balancing between
the opposing ills of ineffective health coverage (if persons with disabilities
are compelled to enroll in mainstream managed care plans without any
accommodation of their needs) and harmful and stigmatizing discrimination
(if persons with disabilities are segregated and deprived of desirable benefits
on the basis of their disabilities).
While state Medicaid planners understandably enough may not relish the
prospect of stepping onto this high wire (for who among us does not have
some fear of falling), the remedial force of the ADA flows from this very

133. This also appears to be the case in Rhode Island's Rite Care program. See supra
note 69 & accompanying text.
134.

MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND

AMERICAN LAW

20 (1990).
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result. For the ADA denies that state agencies may simply provide benefits
to persons with disabilities based on what is customary, convenient, or
cheap.'3 5 Instead, the potential for ADA liability may function to push
state agencies towards the development of managed care systems sensitive
to the needs and concerns of disabled Medicaid recipients. By causing
public programs to be scrutinized through the lens of disability discrimination law, the ADA can act as an engine for social change in the treatment
of persons with disabilities. As suggested by this article, however, the
scrutiny compelled by the ADA is unlikely to produce simple conclusions.
Ultimately, while the implications of the ADA for Medicaid managed care
cannot be ignored, any litigation of these questions will demand judicial
sensitivity in addressing the questions of effectiveness and integration.

135. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111), at 50 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445, 473 ("The fact that it is more convenient, either administratively or fiscally, to provide
services in a segregated manner, does not constitute a valid justification for separate or
different services under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, or under (Title II of the
ADA].").

